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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STA'IE OF UTAH 
L J. GARN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY COR-
PORATION, a municipal 
corpora ti on of the 
s~te of Utah, and 
UNION STREET RAILWAY 
CORPORATION, a corpo.c-
ation of the state of 
Massachusetts, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 11333 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE AND IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
TO DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION 
Defendants submit this Memorandum in response 
:o the Court's Order to Show Cause dated July 22, 
968, as their showing why plaintiff's Petition 
or Writ of Prohibition herein should be denied 
nd in support of their Motion to Dismiss the 
~ti ti on for writ of Prohibition upon the grounds 
2 
that the Petition fails to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an original proceeding instituted 
in this Court by plaintiff, a taxpayer of Salt 
Lake City, praying for a Writ to prevent defendant 
Salt Lake City Corporation from performing an 
Agreement of July 18, 1968, between the defendant 
City and the defendant Union Street Railway Cor-
poration relating to bus transportation in Salt 
Lake City. Plaintiff alleges the City is without 
legal authority or power to perform such agreement 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are not in dispute. They appear 
from the =r:ecitals contained in the Agreement 
between Salt Lake City Corporation and Union 
Street Railway Company dated July 16, 1968, copy 
of which is attached to the Pe ti ti on for Writ of 
Prohibition. 
The Agreement was made after this Court's 
3 
decision in Rich v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 
20 Utah 2d 339, 437 P. 2d 690 (February 20, 
1968). In that case, as this, it appears Salt 
Lake City Lines, Inc. for many years operated the 
public bus transportation system in Salt Lake 
1 
City and metropolitan area. City Lines indicated 
that due to increasing deficits incurred by it, 
it intended to discontinue its business and 
wind up its operations. The Board of Commissione1 
of Salt Lake City resolved that the City, being 
the only entity capable of operating a transpor-
tation system, would operate a bus transportation 
system and that the City would enter into nego-
tiations with Salt Lake City Lines, Inc. for the 
purchase of its facilities and property. This 
Court, in the Rich case, held the City, under 
the constitution and statutes of Utah, has the 
, power to acquire and operate the bus transpor-
tation system as proposed by it, and particularly 
4 
under Section 10-8-14, U.C.A. 1953, which provides 
"They {the cities) may construct, 
maintain and operate water works, gas 
works, electric light works, telephone 
lines or street railways, or authorize 
the construction, maintenance and oper-
ation of the same by others, or purchase 
or lease such works from any person or 
corporation, and they may sell and de-
liver the surplus product or service 
of any such works, not required by the 
city or its inhabitants, to others beyond 
the limits of the City." 
This court held the words "street railways" in-
eludes motor buses. 
After the Rich decision, the situation for 
City Lines became more critical, for its union 
voted to strike unless its demands for wage in-
creases were met, but continued to work only 
upon assurances from the City that attempts would 
be made to increase wages. City Lines, Inc. 
maintained it could not grant a wage increase and 
that it had no alternative other than to go out 
of business and cease operating its bus line 
system. The Board of commissioners of the City 
5 
determined that loss of the bus system would 
amount to a major catastrophe causing great loss 
to the business community and great handicap and 
inconvenience to its residents in moving about 
the City and its environs. Hence, the Board 
conducted extensive investigation and found no 
prospect whatever of any private enterprise per-
manently taking over and operating the bus line 
system. As authorized by the Rich case, the 
City negotiated with City Lines for the purchase 
of its facilities and property. City Lines 
offered to either (1) sell the assets of the bus 
line to the City for more than $500,000 or (2) 
to lease the assets to the City for which City 
Lines would manage the bus line for one year for 
a certain consideration, provided the City would 
obligate itself to purchase the equipment -at the 
end of one year, and provided the City furnished 
the labor for operating the bus line. For the 
City to furnish the labor meant not only negotiati 
6 
with the Union but also bringing the bus employ-
ees into the City's higher existing wage scale. 
The City did not have the funds to meet City 
Lines' purchase price and lacked the operating 
experience in the bus business to know whether 
it was even wise to presently obligate itself to 
make such purchase in one year. The City desired 
further time to investigate the desirability of 
making the purchase itself and to investigate 
the possibilities .and practicalities of obtaining 
financial grants or loans from the Federal Govern-
ment under enabling federal legislation. If 
such federal plan appears desirable and practical, 
the City may establish a transit authority with 
the federal funds to purchase and operate the 
bus line which may obviate the necessity of the 
City even purchasing and operating the bus line 
at all. More than one year would be required for 
the City to determine whether it should purchase 
'the bus lines, or should apply for federal funds, 
7 
or should establish a mass transit authority to 
purchase and operate it. 
With the City in that situation, then 
appeared defendant Union Street. Under the 
! Agreement now attacked, it agreed to purchase the 
same assets from City Lines and to give the City 
the four things the City immediately needed, 
being: {l) a bus line operating in and about 
I 
isalt Lake City for two years on fixed schedules 
! 
I at fixed rates so that service could be maintained 
I 
I 
; (2) a two year option to purchase the bus line 
! assets and not a requirement that the city pur-
chase them for $500,000 plus interest, less de-
preciation plus the value of any additions and 
less the value of any deletions in bus line 
assets during the two years; (3) management 
assistance from experienced bus operators to 
help the City to determine whether to ultimately 
Purchase the bus line or whether to apply for 
federal aid, and assistance in applying for federa 
8 
grants or loans if that appears desirable, 
assistance in establishing a public transit 
authority and full financial information to 
give the city two years actual operating exper-
ience in bus operations, all designed to provide 
a smooth transition into whatever new plan might 
be worked out on the most prudent basis after 
the two years without interruption of scheduled 
bus service; and (4) most important, two years 
time for the City to determine the best basis 
, for working out a permanent, prudent solution to 
the problem of insuring adequate bus transporta-
tion in the City without interruption of bus 
service before or during the two year period. 
In return, the City agreed to pay Union Street 
$6,200 per month for the first 12 months and 
$11, 250 per month for the next 12 months, payable 
at the end of each month of operation provided 
Union street has not defaulted in the preceding 
month. The Board of Commissioners of the City 
9 
determined that such payment would be less 
expensive than if, after purchasing or leasing 
the bus line from City Lines, it contracted with 
city Lines for management or managed it itself. 
The Board of Commissioners expressly found that 
the Agreement would enhance the general welfare 
of the inhabitants of the City and that the 
payments provided would be in the public interest. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff attacks the Agreement, saying 
the City has no power to make such payments under 
the Constitution and statutes of Utah for three 
reasons: 
1. The City does not own the bus line, 
contrary to Section 10-8-14, u.c.A. 1953. 
2. The City is lending its credit to 
or subsidizing a private corporation, 
contrary to Article VII, Section 31, Utah 
Constitution. 
3. The City is benefiting and subsidizing 
10 
persons out of Salt Lake City by providing 
them bus service contrary to 10-8-14, u.c. 
A. 1953. 
Plaintiff, in effect, would have the City follow 
the more expensive course. Defendants submit 
the City has the power to make such payments 
under the Agreement and is not in violation of 
law in so doing. 
POINT I. THE CITY HAS THE POWER TO MAKE 
t1AYMENTS UNDER THE CONTRACT EVEN THOUGH THE CITY 
DOES NOT PRESENTLY OWN THE BUS LINE. 
Plaintiff in substance complains that City l 
has no proprietary interest in Union Street, has 
only an option to purchase the bus assets, that 
the money paid to Union Street over the two year 
: period will not be credited to the option purchase 
. price, that the City has no control or interest 
in the assets or actions of Union Street, in no 
way participates in the operation of Union Street, 
and 2sserts an option to purchase is not a lease 
11 
as permitted under 10-8-14, u.c.A. 1953. 
Consider first that Salt Lake City is not 
paying just for bus service, as plaintiff asserts: 
instead, it is also paying for and receiving 
valuable management experience and expertise in 
learing to operate a bus line to be used if the 
City elects to purchase and operate it, to be 
used in deciding whether to purchase and operate 
it, to be used in determining whether to apply 
for federal funds and if such appears to be 
desirable, to be used in applying for and obtain-
ing the federal funds. Further, the City is i 
paying for and receiving an option to purchase 
the assets to insure that at the end of two 
years those bus line assets still will be avail- ::-
able, not as disorganized pieces of equipment, 
but as part of a going concern. 
Plaintiff ignores the fact that the City 
Will receive value through the management exper-
ience and the option to purchase for its monthly 
12 
payments. These standing by themselves support 
the City's power to enter into the agreement 
and to make the payments, for under Section 10-
7-1, U.C.A. 1953, cities may "make contracts and 
acquire and hold real and personal property for 
corporate purposes" and Section 10-8-2, u. c.A. 
1953 provides: 
"They (the cities) may appropriate 
money for corporate purposes only .•• ; 
may purchase, receive, hold, sell, lease, 
convey and dispose of property, real 
and personal, for the benefit of the 
City, both within and without its cor-
porate boundaries, improve and protect 
such property and may do all other 
things in relation thereto as natural 
persons .... It shall be deemed a cor-
porate purpose to appropriate money 
for any purpose which in the judgment 
of the Board of Commissioners or City 
Council will provide for the safety, 
preserve the health, promote the pros- ,_ 
perity and improve the morals, peace, 
order, comfort and convenience of the 
inhabitants of the City." 
The Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City 
expressly found that the Agreement will provide 
for the general welfare of the inhabitants of 
the City in the statutory language, thereby 
13 
making such payment a proper appropriation for 
corporate purposes within Section 10-8-2 and a 
proper contract for corporate purposes within 
section 10-7-1. The wisdom and practicality of 
the City so contracting for the management 
experience and option to purchase is an under-
taking solely for the people of the City through 
their elected city government to determine and 
is not a concern of the courts whose function is 
to pass on questions of law. See concurring c 
opinion of Chief Justice Crockett in Rich v. 
Salt Lake City Corporation, supra. 
There can be no question that City has the 
power to purchase the option to purchase. Under 
Section 10-8-2, the City "may purchase and receive_ 
... property ... , and may do all things in relation 
thereto as natural persons •.•. " An option itself 
is property. Lawrence v. O'Connell (D.C.R.I.) 
141 F. Supp. 316, Affd. 1st Cir., 238 F. 2d 476. 
The word 11 purchase" means all lawful acquisitions 
14 
of property by any means whatever, except 
descent. 73 CJS, p. 1255. It is well settled 
that power of a city to acquire property by pur-
chase includes the lesser power to acquire propert 
by lease. Anno., 11 ALR 2d 168. In Borough of 
East Rutherford v. Sterling Paper Converting co. 
(N.J.) 32 A. 2d 855, it was held where the city 
has the power to lease property, it has the im-
plied power to grant an option to lease as an 
incident of the specifically granted power. Bohn c 
v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 8 P.2d 591 (1932) 
approved language from Dillon, Municipal Corpora-
tions, that the grant of power to a city carries 
' with it such power as is necessarily and fairly 
implied or incident thereto; that implied and 
incidental powers include those necessary to give 
effect to the powers expressly granted; and that 
the rule of strict construction of powers granted 
municipal corporations does not apply to the mode 
adopted by the municipality to carry into effect 
15 
powers expressly or plainly granted where the 
mode is not limited or prescribed by the legisla-
ture and is left to the discretion of municipal 
authorities, and in such cases the usual test 
of the validity of the act is whether it is 
teasonable and there is no presumption against 
the municipal action in such cases. 
In light of such authorities, there can be 
no question that the city here has power to pur-
chase an option to purchase. 
section 10-7-20, u.c.A. 1953, says: 
"Nothing in this article shall be 
construed to require bids to be called 
for or contracts let for the conduct 
or management of any of the departments, 
business or property of such city •..• " 
That section clearly grants City the power to 
contract for management experience in operating 
the bus lines, first since the operation of a 
bus line is a proper business of the City and 
second, because it is contracting for the manage-
ment of the property over which it holds an 
16 
option to purchase. 
Now, then, taking plaintiff's position that 
the City is paying only for bus service when it 
does not own the property, we submit that the 
City still has the power to make the payment. 
Obviously, under Section 10-8-2, the City 
could have purchased the bus line and managed 
it itself, or could have purchased it and leased 
it to Union Street, or could have leased the 
bus line from City Lines and under 10-8-2 and 
10-7-20 could have hired Union Street to manage 
it for a management fee. However, here the Board 
of Commissioners specifically found that it did 
not have the funds to purchase the assets, and 
whether it purchased or leased the assets, operat-
ing the bus line itself or hiring City Lines to 
operate it would have been more expensive than 
paying the payments provided under the Agreement 
i in issue. That the City would have otherwise 
incurred greater expense, even if it purchased 
17 
the line for over $500,000, answers plaintiff's 
argument that the money paid by the City over 
the two year period will not be credited to the 
purchase prive for the assets if the City exercise 
the option. That also answers plaintiff's argu-
ment that the City has no control over the actions 
of Union Street and no proprietary interest in the 
corporation, for by the terms of the contract, 
Union Street takes all of the risk of loss in 
operating the bus line. The Board of commissioner 
of Salt Lake City expressly found it to be one 
of the advantages in entering into the Agreement 
that the City would not incur the risk of loss. 3 
Finally, the fact that the City has the option !: 
to purchase the bus line assets, which certainly 
is an equitable right, destroys the argument that 
the City has no interest or control over the 
assets. 
It is true Section 10-8-14 provides only 
that cities may "maintain and operate ..• street 
18 
railways (read "Bus Line", Rich v. Salt Lake 
City, supra), or authorize the construction, 
maintenance and operation of the same by others, 
or purchase of lease such works from any person." 
and does not expressly say the City may pay for 
the operation of the bus line of another. 
It is submitted, however, that since the 
City has the option to purchase the bus line and 
it is a proper business of the City, the City 
may contract for the management thereof pursuant 
to Section 10-7-20, U.C.A. 1953. 
Further, there is ample authority to support 
the proposition that the City does have the im-
' plied power to pay for the operation of a bus line: 
by another, even though the City does not own the 
bus line. 
In Bair v. Layton City Corporation, 6 Utah 
2d 138, 307 P.2d 895 (1957) Layton City contracted 
with North Davis County Sewer District to make 
monthly payments to the sewer district for 
19 
operating expenses of the District's sewer 
system in return for the District providing the 
services of disposal and treatment of sewage. 
Plaintiff taxpayers sought a writ to enjoin 
payment upon the grounds, among others, that the 
City had no constitutional or statutory power to 
make the payments. This Court held: 
"The general powers conferred on 
the city and its officers as governing 
body clearly authorize the city to 
enter into this kind of contract. See 
Article 11, Section 5, Subdivision (5) 
constitution of Utah; sections 10-7-1, 
10-8-2, 10-8-61, 10-8-38, u.c.A. 1953 
and Laws of Utah, 1955, Chapter 26, 
Section 2." 
The case here is stronger on its facts than in 
~- Layton City did not own the sewer district': 
property, as here, but here Salt Lake City does 
have an option to purchase the property. Sections 
i0-7-1 and 10-8-2 have been cited above; they 
each were held sufficient in Bair to authorize 
Layton City to make the payments objected to. 
Section 10-8-61 is a general statute providing 
20 
cities may make regulations to secure the 
general health of the city, etc. 
Section 10-8-38 cited in Bair is important; 
it provides cities "may construct, reconstruct, 
maintain and operate, sewer systems, sewage treat-
ment plants, ... " It does not provide cities may 
pay another to maintain and operate sewage treat-
ment plants which the City does not own; yet 
this Court sustained Layton City's implied power 
to do so under that section. So here, though 
Section 10-8-14 does not provide cities may pay 
another to operate bus lines it does not own, 
the Court should here sustain the city's power 
to do so. 
Laws of Utah, 1955, Chapter 26, Section 2, 
cited in Bair, is now Section 17-6-22 of the 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, and that Section and 
Section 17-6-3.8(c) provide only that sewer 
districts may contract with "municipal corporatior 
for sewer services,but do not provide municipal 
21 
corporations may pay for such service. 
This Court's citation of Article XI, Section 
5, subdivision (5), Constitution of Utah, in 
Bair is significant. Article XI provides: 
"Each city forming its charter 
under this section shall have, and is 
hereby granted, the authority to ex-
ercise all powers relating to municipal 
affairs, •.• and no enumeration of powers 
in this constitution or any law shall 
be deemed to limit or restrict the gen-
eral authority hereby conferred; but 
this grant of authority shall not ... be 
deemed to limit or restrict the power of 
the legislature in matters relating to 
State Affairs to enact general laws 
applicable to all cities of the State. 
"The power to be conferred upon 
the cities by this section shall in-
clude the following: 
***** 
" {b) To furnish all local 
public services, to purchase, hire, 
construct, own, maintain or oper-
ate, or lease, public utilities, 
local in extent and use;" (emphasis add 
Does that article confer on Salt Lake City the 
power to hire public utilities? Its citation in 
~air v. Layton City corporation would seem to 
22 
indicate it does, since Layton City is a legis-
lative city, and not a charter city. Rich v. 
salt Lake City Corporation, supra, held: 
"Salt Lake City being a legisla-
tive city as contrasted with a charter 
city, we must look at the acts of the 
legislature in determining what powers 
may be exercised by the City." 
Utah Rapid Transit Co. v. Ogden City, 89 Utah 
2d 546, 58 P.2d 1, held to the same effect as 
Rich but was overruled by this Court in Rich on 
other grounds. Utah Rapid Transit co. relied 
for authority upon Wadsworth v. Santa Quin City, 
83 Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161. There, this Court 
said: 
"The question there is, Are the 
powers enumerated in the amendment 
(Article XI) equally available to cities 
operating under legislative enactment? 
The answer we think must be in the 
affirmative, at least to the extent 
that the legislature has conferred any 
such powers on the cities .•.. The 
reservoir of power is the same, and 
we can perceive of no reason to distin~ 
guish between the charter adopted by 
the people of a city and one enacted by 
general law of the Legislature based 
23 
merely on the origin of the legisla-
tion .... We think the enumeration of 
the power to borrow money on the secur-
ity of a utility or its income, or 
both, was intended by the people in 
adopting the constitutional amendment 
to place such power within the scope 
of municipal action, and was clearly 
intended to be available to chartered 
cities informing their own charters, and 
in addition thereto by use of the lan-
guage, 'power to be conferred upon the 
cities by this section,' just as clearly 
was intended to enumerate a power which 
the Legislature might, if it chose, 
confer on cities depending on general 
law for their organization and authority." 
While the Wadsworth case held that all cities do 
not have all the powers enumerated in the amend-
ment because the amendment is not self-executing, 
it did hold that all the powers enumerated in 
the amendment are equally available to cities 
operating under legislative enactment, "at least 
to the extent that the Legislature has conferred 
any such powers on the cities." Here the Legis-
lature has conferred on cities the powers to 
1 
maintain and operate bus lines or to authorize 
the maintenance and operation of the same by 
24 
Jthers under Section 10-8-14; the Legislature 
has to that extent conferred 11 any such powers 
on the cities. 11 Did the Leg is la tu re also intend 
to confer on cities the power to hire public 
utilities? As in Wadsworth, there is 11 no reason 
to distinguish beb1een a charter adopted by the 
people of a city and one enacted by the general 
law of the Legislature. Thus, it would seem the 
Legislature did impliedly confer on legislative 
dties the power to hire public utilities. 
City of Mill Valley v. Saxton (Cal. 1940) 
106 P.2d 455 where the Court said: 
11 Amicus curiae advance the point 
that the constitutional section is not 
self-executing and that hence the city is 
without the power to act in the absence 
of a legislative enabling act. It is 
then contended that, since certain 
sections of the Municipal Corporations 
Act fail to mention bus lines specific-
ally, the city is without power to esta-
blish them. Both the premise and the 
conclusion are erroneous. The Constitu-
tion expressly authorizes 'any' city 
to establish and operate public works 
for 'transportction'. It expressly 
authorizes such city to furnish 'such 
25 
services to inhabitants outside its 
boundaries'. Here is the grant of 
power. If the legislature should 
attempt by statutory enactment to deny 
or with~old the power as to any special 
class of cities its act would be clearly 
unconstitutional. If it attempted the 
same result indirectly by failing to 
mention the power in some corollary 
legislation, its act to that extent 
would have no effect on the constitu-
tional grant." {Emphasis added.) 
Even if the City's power to. make the pay-
rnents to Union Street is not found by implication 
under Section 10-8-14, it is clearly available 
under Section 10-8-2 and 10-7-1 as an appropria-
tion of money for corporate purposes. Muir v. 
Murray City, 55 Utah 368, 186 P. 433, sustained 
llie power of the city to establish an electric 
light plant and transmission lines beyond its 
boundaries under section 10-8-2 and said of the 
section: 
"{I) t is pertinent to remark that 
perhaps no State in the Union confers 
greater powe s upon its municipal cor-
porations than does the State of Utah." 
In point is Admiral Realty co. v. City of 
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New York (N.Y. 1920) 99 NE 241. There New York 
city owned and operated a subway system and a 
private company owned and operated an adjoining 
system in an adjoining town. A contract was 
made for the adjoining company to construct and 
equip new subways both in and out of New York 
at their joint expense and for joint operation 
by the adjoining company of the entire new system, 
including the new construction as well as the 
systems formerly operated separately by the City 
and the adjoining company. The contract provided 
that from the earnings of the entire consolidabed 
unit, payment would be made first to the adjoining 
company of its operating expense for the new 
entire system, next to the adjoining company 
principal and interest on the money spent by it 
for new construction and equipment, next to the 
adjoining company an annual sum equal to the 
earnings of its present operations on its pre-
construction system, next, payment to New York 
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city on account of its investment, and finally, 
a division of the remainder equally between the 
city and the adjoining company. The New York 
court found the City had the implied power to 
perform the agreenent. The Court relied upon 
prior authority for the_ propositions that the 
construction of subways by the City is a city 
purpose and that the City need not itself operate 
its own subway but might provide for its operation 
by lease to someone else. The Court sustained 
the City's implied power under general statutory 
provisions to perform the contract despite objec-
lions that the city was guaranteeing earnings to 
the adjoining company of the latter's former 
system and that the city was contributing money 
to the private company to improve the private 
company's own subway system. The only difference 
between the Admiral Realty case and the case at 
1Jar is that New York City already owned the sub-
way system in its own city which is not the case 
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here; however, the cases are identical as 
respects the portion of the subway system owned 
by the adjoining company outside of the City. 
It is submitted that in light of the 
foregoing, plaintiff's contention that the City 
has no power to perform the Agreement in issue 
because the City does not own, but has only an 
option to purchase, the bus line is without 
merit. 
POINT II. THE CITY IS NOT LENDING ITS 
CREDIT TO OR SUBSIDIZING A PRIVATE CORPORATION 
CON'Il'.RARY TO ARTICLE VII, SECTION 31 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
Article VII, Section 31, of the Utah Con-
stitution provides: 
"The Legislature shall not authorize 
... any .•. city ••• to lend its credit or 
subscribe to stock or bonds in aid of 
any railroad, telegraph or other private 
individual or corporate enterprise or 
undertaking." 
It is clear that operating a bus line is a 
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proper public service and municipal purpose. 
Rich v. Salt Lake City Corporation; 10-8-14, 
u.c.A. 1953. 
In State Road Commission of Utah v. Utah 
power & Light Co., 10 Utah 2d 333, 353 P.2d 171, 
against the contention that the State could not 
pay the Power Company for relocation of utility 
poles under the Utility Relocation Act by virtue 
of Article VII, Section 31, of tre Constitution, 
this Court said: 
"Public welfare demands that the 
public be served with water, sewer 
systems, electricity, gas, telephone 
and telegraph, as well as transporta-
tion and means of travel. These 
services are vital to the well-being 
of our various communities. It would 
be almost impossible to meet these urgent 
requirements without making use of 
public property. The presence of the 
utility facilities on the streets consti-
tute a use in the public interest ..• 
"We said that Article VI, Section 
31, of our constitution is not violated 
even when direct gifts and loans of 
state funds are made to people in need 
under our public Welfare Program because 
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of a public purpose served in discharg-
ing, not the legal, but the moral 
obligation, of the State to care for 
its poor .... " 
In Bailey v. Van Dyke, 66 Utah 184, 240 
P. 454, it was claimed that the County's payment 
for agricultural extension work in conducting 
field studies and demonstrations on farms to 
assist in stimulating better business methods 
on the farms violated this article of the con-
stitution. This Court held to the contrary, 
saying: 
"If the appropriation of county 
funds authorized is for a public purpose, 
the statute (under which the payment 
is made) is clearly not prohibited by 
the Constitution." 
Bair v. Layton City Corporation, supra, held 
the contract did not violate this Article of 
the Constitution and it is identical on its 
facts to this case. 
In Utah State Land Board v. Utah State 
Finance Commission, 12 Utah 2d 265, 365 P. 2d 213, 
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the State Land Board sought to purchase private 
securities for investment purposes pursuant to 
statute; the State Finance Commission contended 
such contravened this Article of the Constitution. 
This Court held: 
"The provision 'in aid of any rail-
road' etc., was expressly intended to 
prevent the use of the finances of the 
State to give support to private inter-
ests or enterprises, but unless the 
element of aiding such enterprise is 
present, there is no indication in the 
language of the Constitutional provision 
itself, nor in the background of its 
origin, that the State or its agency 
should be prohibited from the purchase 
of well established corporate securities 
in the interest of prudent handling of 
the funds defendant is required to 
manage. The activating purpose makes 
the difference. 
"When the underlying purpose is 
to invest for the benefit of the State 
or a political subdivision thereof, 
there is no lending of credit or expendi-
ture of funds 'in aid of' such enter-
prise or undertaking .•.. 
"'When the underlying and activa-
ting purpose of the transaction 
and the financial obligation incur-
red are for the state's benefit, 
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there is no lending of its credit 
though it may have expended its 
funds or incurred an obligation 
that benefits another. Merely 
because the State incurs an indebt-
edness or expends its funds for 
its benefit and others may incident-
ally profit thereby, does not bring 
the transaction within the letter 
or the spirit of the credit clause 
prohibition.'" 
Here the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake 
City expressly found the Agreement to be for 
the general welfare and hence for the benefit 
of the City. The City is to pay the monthly 
payments only after each month's services are 
rendered. Assuming the payments to be for a 
"corporate purpose", the payments are no more 
made "in aid of" private enterprise than would 
be payment to a private contractor for painting 
the City and County Building. 
Cases such as Cinncinati v. Harth {Ohio 1920) 
128 N.E. 263, 13 ALR 309 and Anno. at 313, which 
i held unconstitutional a statute authorizing 
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cities to pay for the reconstruction of railroad 
tracks, are distinguishable. In that case, the 
uhio constitution provided that a city could not 
"raise money for, or loan its credit to, or 
in aid of, any such company". Here, our Consti-
tution does not prohibit raising money for or 
loans to private corporations; it prohibits only 
lending credit to or subscribing to the stock or 
bonds in aid of private corporations, and this 
Agreement is neither a lending of credit nor a 
subscription. Further, there is a distinct 
beneficial necessary reason for Salt Lake City 
to make this Agreement; the payments are made 
to obviate the necessity of City immediately 
purchasing the bus line, to minimize the expense 
of the City's operating the bus line or hiring 
another to do it, and to preserve a going 
business for a limited period while the City 
determines, with management assistance it has 
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purchased under the Agreement, whether to 
exercise the purchase option the City purchases 
under the Agreement. This is in distinct con-
trast to the situation in Cincinnati v. Harth 
where the payment was made solely to benefit 
the railroad and only indirectly to help the 
City. Finally, it is submitted that this Court 
should simply decline to follow the reasoning 
of Cincinnati v. Harth as its views do not state 
the law of Utah. 
Plaintiff's Memorandum terms the payment to 
Union street as a "subsidy". This is clearly 
inaccurate. A subsidy is a gift or donation 
from the government. Kennecott Copper Corpora-
tion v. State Tax Commission (D.C. Utah 1944), 
60 F.Supp. 181. Here, the City is receiving 
full value and minimizing the expenses it would 
otherwise face for the reasons indicated. 
POINT III. THE CITY HAS POWER TO PERFORM 
THE AGREEMENT EVEN THOUGH IT ALSO PROVIDES FOR 
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BLJS SERVICE OUTSIDE SALT LAKE CITY. 
Plaintiff claims the City does not have 
power to spend its funds for the benefit of 
persons other than its own citizens and that it 
is so doing because City Lines now operates in 
metropolitan Salt Lake and Union Street will 
similarly operate. 
Section 10-8-14, u.c.A. 1953, at its conclu-
sion, provides: 
" ••• (T)hey (the cities) may sell 
and deliver the surplus product or ser-
vice of any such works, not required 
by the city or its inhabitants, to others 
beyond the limits of the city." 
Provo City v. Department of Business Regu-
lation, 118 Utah 1, 218 P. 2d 675 (1950), held: 
"The term "street railways' as used 
in that section (10-8-14) has been in-
terpreted to mean transit companies 
operating within the city limits or 
within the municipal area." 
In Muir v. Murray City, supra, the contention 
Was made that the City was without power to 
raise funds to construct an electric transmission 
-
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line to furnish power to a corrununity 7 miles 
beyond the municipal boundaries. This court 
held to the contrary, saying: 
"In the case at bar the City had 
the power to establish an electric light 
plant and transmission line, beyond its 
boundaries, if necessary, for the pur-
pose of supplying light for itself and 
inhabitants. Comp. Laws Utah 1917, Sec. 
570-12 (now 10-8-2, u.c.A. 1953). 
" •.• The investment (for which the 
money was raised and to which plaintiff 
objected) proved to be a profitable 
one, and while, as before stated, cities 
are not organized primarily as profit-
making concerns, yet when it is incidental, 
as in the instant case, to a proper exer-
cise of its legitimate powers, the making 
of the enterprise a profitable one was 
highly corrunendable." (Emphasis added.) 
In City of Mill Valley v. Saxton, supra, 
the California Court said: 
"The respondent attacks the install-
ation of the system on the grounds that 
it would require the taxpayers of the 
city to support the transportation system 
not only for its own inhabitants but also 
of those of the traveling public outside 
its boundaries. This it is said might 
be a gift of public funds for private 
purposes and hence contrary to the 
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provisions of ... the Constitution . 
... Here we have a case where public 
service is exchanged for a compensation 
and it will not be assumed that the city 
will misuse the power by giving the 
transportation free. On the contrary, 
it will be presumed that the city will 
exercise the power fairly and in accord-
ance with the purposes of the statutes. 
That non-taxpayers living outside the 
boundaries of the city may thus obtain 
an advantage at the risk of the taxpayers 
within the city is no more serious obstacle 
to the validity of the scheme than that 
non-taxpayers living within the city 
limits may enjoy the same advantage. 
But if this feature of the general scheme 
is objectionable on the grounds stated, it 
goes to the entire public utility service 
based within and without the municipal 
boundaries. If the plan is economically 
sound for this reason, the objections 
raised are administrative and legislative, 
rather than judicial. Here we have to 
consider only that the Constitution and 
the statute has conferred the power upon 
the city and the wisdom of the legislature 
is not a matter for us to decide." 
See the Annotation, 98 ALR 1001, in which 
, the annotator says: 
"Although the later cases tend to 
support a more liberal rule, the majority 
of thecases collected in a present and 
earlier annotations support the view that 
a municipal corporation authorized to 
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own and opera e a public service utility 
has no power, in the absence of statutory 
authority, to furnish service beyond 
corporate limits." 
~e annotation, based on Muir v. Murray City, 
supra, places Utah in the class of cases follow-
ing the growing minority view that cities may 
sell their product outside of corporate limits. 
In Wisconsin Power & Light Company v. Public 
Service Conunission (Wisc. 1939), 286 N.W. 588, 
the city desired to buy a power line which was 
an entirely integrated unit and a section of it 
was located outside the city limits. When the 
transaction was challenged the court held that 
when the legislature allowed the city to take 
over a power line, it must have intended the 
power to include the whole even though portions 
of the whole were outside the city limits. 
These cases support the opposition that 
Salt Lake City has the power to make the payments 
to Union Street even though Union street operates 
out of city limits. Certainly, it has that 
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power by statute to the extent of the surplus 
service, and whether or not there is surplus 
service available is an administrative and 
legislative decision to be made by the Board of 
corrunissioners of Salt Lake City in the exercise 
of its judgment, and such judgment is not subject 
to judicial review. 
Further, City Lines is required by its 
certificate of convenience and necessity to 
furnish common carrier service on the lines it 
is now operating under. It cannot simply cease 
operating outside of Salt Lake City without the 
approval of the public Service Commission. It 
could not sell its operating equipment to Union 
Street and still provide service to areas out 
of Salt Lake City. In selling, it must require 
its purchaser to agree to operate all of the 
system, in and out of Salt Lake City, that it 
is required to serve. If the City purchased or 
leased the system from City Lirm, the City would 
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be obligated to serve metropolitan Salt Lake 
in order to provide service to the City itself. 
Ergo, so must Union Street. 
Further, any benefit occurring to citizens 
out of Salt Lake City is indirect and merely 
incidental. No more direct benefit and indivis-
ible benefit is conferred on County residents 
than would be conferred when Salt Lake City pays 
for air polution control programs in Salt Lake 
City which may also keep the air clean out of 
Salt Lake City. 
Finally, the fact that the bus line does 
operate out of Salt Lake City is a direct benefit 
to the residents of Salt Lake City. City resi-
dents do need transportation to the rretropolitan 
area out of the Salt Lake City limits. The 
Board of commissioners of Salt Lake City expressl~ 
found, in entering into the Agreement: 
"The loss of such transportation 
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system to the residents of Salt Lake 
City would amount to a major catastro-
phe causing great loss to the business 
community of the city and great handi-
cap and great inconvenience to the 
residents of Salt Lake City in moving 
about the City and its environs." 
Hence even if a portion of the City's payment 
could be segregated into "x" for city transpor-
Lation and "y" for county transportation, the 
payment for "Y" has still been found by the 
Board of Commissioners to be for a corporate 
purpose for the citizens of the City. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that as a 
matter of law defendant Salt Lake City Corpora-
tion does have power to perform the Agreement 
with defendant Union street Railway Corporation, 
that plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Prohibition 
should be denied and this action should be 
dismissed with prejudice. 
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DATED this 26th day of July, 1968. 
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